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Operational and repl. for ^{quarterly} period ending 31 Oct 68. **CONFIDENTIAL**

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FOR OT-UT-684276

27 February 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, United States
Capital Military Assistance Command (Prov) (U) ~~Period ending 31 October 1968~~ (U)

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2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

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Kenneth G. Wickham

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES CAPITAL MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND (PROV)
APO San Francisco 96243

AVCE-GC

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Capital Military Assistance Command (PROV)
for Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

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1. (C) Section 1, Operations: Significant Activities.

a. General: Throughout the reporting period, Headquarters, Capital Military Assistance Command (CMAC) (PROV) continued the expansion in personnel and facilities required to better accomplish its critical role in the defense of Saigon. A net gain of 126 personnel was realized, to bring the total strength to 425 officers and EM. The awards and decorations program picked up momentum with a total of 51 being processed, including three Impact Awards to Vietnamese personnel. Operations during the quarter were directed mainly at locating the elusive enemy and then rapidly applying combat power to destroy him. Enemy caches were the subject of intensified search operations which resulted in the discovery of significant quantities of materiel. The CMAC Artillery section continued to perfect quick reaction techniques related to the counter rocket/mortar system, and a comprehensive bridge inspection program was initiated by the Engineer Office which resulted in a significant improvement in protection. At the end of the reporting period, two separate Infantry brigades, an air cavalry squadron (-) and an artillery battalion were under operational control of Commanding General, CMAC.

b. G-1 Activities:

(1) Throughout the reporting period, the OACofS, G-1 initiated and compiled data for a USARV manpower survey to be conducted in November 1968.

(2) The health, morale, discipline and safety within the command remained excellent.

(3) The following awards and decorations were processed:

(a) Legion of Merit

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(b) Bronze Star Medal	25
(c) Army Commendation Medal	12
(d) Air Medal	6
(e) Impact awards	3

(4) The personnel strength of Headquarters, CMAC increased during the quarter as shown:

Officer gains	44	EM gains	205
Officer loses	32	EM loses	91
Net gain	12		114

Assigned Strength 31 October 1968: Officers: 90 Enlisted: 335

c. G-2 Activities: (Ref: Maps, Special Use SE Asia 1:100,000 series L 607, Sheets 6230 and 6330)

(1) The G-2 Section expanded its liaison and coordination with the District Intelligence Operation Coordination Centers (DIOCC) within Gia Dinh Province. Purpose was to establish more effective intelligence exchange between HQ, CMAC, Saigon, District, and Province. The program has markedly improved the overall coordination between CMAC and RVN intelligence gathering agencies.

(2) A comprehensive CMAC Reconnaissance and Surveillance Plan was completed integrating all available means into a flexible, cohesive system responsive to the needs of the ground commander. The result has been a better understood reconnaissance effort and greater efficiency in the employment of the surveillance/reconnaissance means of the command.

(3) The enemy situation during the reporting period was characterized by relative inactivity and dispersion into squad and platoon sized elements. Main force and local force units generally remained outside the CMAC AO, leaving only guerrilla units within the AO. Only one significant contact occurred during the period. On 28 September 1968, the 5th Ranger Group contacted an estimated 50 to 60 man enemy force vic XS715834, later determined to be from the 6th Local Force Battalion. Results of the engagement were 9 EN KIA, 12 PWs. Other contacts, averaging from 6-10 per week, consisted of individual or squad sized enemy engagements, usually terminating immediately after a brief exchange of fire.

(4) There were three significant rocket attacks on Saigon during the reporting period; on 22 August, twenty two rounds of 122mm rockets were fired; on 27 August, four rounds of 107mm; on 31 October one round of 122mm, five rounds 107mm and four rounds of undetermined caliber (five rounds did not explode (due perhaps to deterioration under extreme moist conditions).

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Additionally, a single 122mm rocket exploded on the periphery of Saigon on 6 September. Three rocket incidents occurred within the AO but outside the Saigon metropolitan area. On 4 October, three 107mm rockets were fired at the Nha Be tank farm (XS9182). On 5 September, five 122mm rockets impacted vicinity XS740998.

(5) Enemy initiated incidents consisted of the following:

(a) August: Total of 112 incidents, including 16 terrorist, 79 harassment, and 17 miscellaneous.

(b) September: Total of 136 incidents, including 33 terrorist, 90 harassment, and 13 aircraft receiving fire.

(c) October: Total of 125 incidents, including 19 terrorist, 96 harassment, and 10 miscellaneous.

(6) Significant enemy losses for the period were as follows:

	KIA	PW	Ind/Wpns	Crew Served	Tons of Rice	cpt/dest	Rkts	cpt/dest	107/122
Aug 125	71	229	2	2.275		6	1		
Sep 131	71	199	13	4.7		21	1		
Oct 85	34	163	7	5		0	0		

(7) During most of the reporting period, particularly the latter half, intelligence reports, captured personnel, and documents indicated that the enemy was planning an offensive on Saigon. Elements of the Dong Nai Regiment moved south to positions north of Lai Thieu and Thu Duc Districts. Sub Region 1 elements moved closer to the CMD while SR 2 elements increased supply and infiltration activity. By the end of October, however, the enemy threat lessened substantially, as the Dong Nai Regiment moved away from CMD. In SR 4, elements of the Thu Duc Regt, which had habitually operated in the Thu Duc District (XS9299), moved east away from CMD. Friendly operations to the south of the CMAC/AO reduced the threat from that area and caused the enemy to become increasingly dispersed. Although enemy intentions appeared to remain concentrated on CMD, no offensive materialized by the end of October 1968.

d. Operations: (Ref: Maps, Special Use SE Asia 1:100,000 Series L 607 Sheets 6230 and 6330)

(1) During the reporting period, CMAC area of operation was increased toward the southeast (western Nhon Trach (XS9584), toward the southwest into the Pineapple area (XS6087) and into the Phu Hoa area northwest of the Saigon River (XT7907). Troop strength remained essentially the same with the 3d Bde, 82d Airborne Division replacing the 3d Bde, 25th Infantry Division on 6 October 1968.

(2) Operations were oriented towards detailed searches of well defined areas while pushing out beyond the Capital Military District boundary to locate and destroy the enemy and his caches, and to deny him staging areas from which he could launch either ground, rocket, or mortar attacks on Saigon.

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(3) During the early part of August in AO Knee Bend (see sketch map at Inclosure 1), the 3d Bde, 25th Division conducted detailed search operations along the Hoc Mon Canal (XT6801). There were no contacts with main force units and only light scattered contact with local guerrilla forces. Search operations along the Hoc Mon Canal, however, produced significant findings in equipment and munitions.

(4) The Vinh Loc Village area (XS7195), which had been used in the past as an enemy supply base, was targeted for intense operations. During the period 5-10 August, the 3d Bde, 25th Division conducted "Snatch Operations" with success. These were conducted based on sound intelligence and names of suspects furnished by the District Intelligence Operations Coordination Center. The operations were launched from night ambush positions in vicinity of the targeted hamlets. Several hamlets were moved into simultaneously with well briefed teams which included both US and Vietnamese troops.

(5) Surprise in cordon and search operations was achieved by air landing sufficient forces simultaneously around a single hamlet. Once the seal had been placed in effect the District Headquarters was then contacted to provide the search force. To move sufficient forces to conduct a surprise cordon and search just described required a minimum of 2 airmobile companies.

(6) The Pineapple area east of the Vam Co Dong River (AO Swordfish) is a known enemy base area. By aerial photo, 3700 bunkers were located in this area. Additionally, elements of the 6th and 308th Local Force Battalions were believed located in AO Swordfish. Commencing the latter part of August and continuing to a lesser degree through October, the 199th Light Infantry Brigade, 22d River Assault Group, and forces from 25th ARVN Division conducted operations to locate and destroy the enemy and his caches in this area. The greatest menace to the operation were booby traps which accounted for the majority of the friendly casualties. Operations in AO Swordfish were supported by airstrikes and 8 inch artillery, resulting in many secondary explosions. Along the west bank and in the southwest corner of AO Swordfish there were significant findings of enemy munitions and equipment. Included in the findings was evidence of three hospital installations. In mid October a platoon of engineers joined the 199th LIB in an intensified effort to destroy bunkers in the Pineapple area.

(7) In the Tan Nhut/Tan Kien area of Binh Chanh (XS7083-7383) operations were targeted against the 6th Local Force Battalion. The 5th ARVN Ranger Group and the 199th LIB conducted operations to locate and destroy these enemy elements. Operations in the Tan Nhut/Tan Kien area significantly decreased enemy activity and resulted in findings of equipment and munitions along the banks of the Kinh Sang Canal (XS6984).

(8) In Mid October the 199th LIB employed a new tactic termed "IMEX" (Imposition/Explosion). This concept permits large groups of forces to be used in cordon and search operations. The operation is conducted by emplacing a

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cordon well out from the area of prime concern. The search force is inserted by air inside the ring. Once the search force is inserted the outer ring sweeps or squeezes in toward the center to a well defined no fire line. When the no fire line has been reached, the search force begins pushing outward. Two such operations were conducted by the 199th LIB, one of which resulted in seven PWs.

(9) The Dong Phu Battalion had been slipping back and forth across the CMD/9th Division Boundary in southeast Binh Chan. (XS7975). Specific operations were undertaken in coordination with territorial forces from both Gia Dinh and Long An Provinces. National Field Police were also included in these operations with the main objective to locate and eliminate the Dong Phu Battalion. No significant contacts were made during these operations.

(10) The 3d Bde, 82d Abn Division, almost immediately upon assuming responsibility for their AO, began detailed searches for caches using metal rods as probes and mine detectors. The probe and the mine detector used in combination proved highly effective in locating enemy caches. During the month of October the 3d Bde, 82d Abn Division using these devices had significant findings.

(11) The Waterway Denial Program was strengthened during the first week in August with the addition of the 51st VNN PBR (Patrol Boat, River). With this addition, USN Task Group 116.4 patrolled the Nha Be River (XS9285 to the south) while the 51st Patrolled the Dong Nai River to YSQ497. Patrol effectiveness greatly increased along these waterways. Contingency plans have been established to seal off the major avenues of enemy withdrawal in the event of a rocket attack.

(12) Effective 1 October, each general and special staff section of the Capital Military District (CMD) Advisory Team was placed under operational control of the corresponding CMAC Staff Section. CMAC Section chiefs became responsible for advisory matters pertaining to their functional areas. The purpose was to provide the optimum functional interface and rapport between the complete CMAC staff and the counterpart CMD staff.

(13) Throughout the reporting period, G-3 Plans continued to supervise development of reaction/reinforcement plans for the 50 designated critical installations within the Saigon area. As of 31 October, 18 of the 21 plans required to cover all 50 installations had CMAC final approval. The remaining three plans were in existence and could be effectively executed, but were undergoing revision/correction prior to final approval.

(14) The Non-Combatant Relocation Plan continued in its development. Assembly Areas and helicopter landing zones were designated and planning and coordination were in progress for transportation (air and ground), security, communications and other appropriate tasks. During this period, the estimated number of relocatees increased from 14,000 to 18,000 persons.

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USAID is developing alert, assembly, and accountability procedures which include the establishment and maintenance of computerized records on all US Government sponsored non-combatants. As of 31 October, approximately 3500 names had been cataloged. The completion date is estimated for late January or early February, concurrently with the USAID alert plan.

(15) Other major plans include the Accelerated Pacification Program (Operation Cleanup), the Counter-Offensive Plan (OPLAN Richmond Rebel), and the Enemy Interdiction Plan (OPLAN YAL PALON). Mission statements were also published for 2 OPCON brigades.

(16) The Defoliation program CMD received emphasis and has been moderately accelerated. Even US requests for chemical defoliation were submitted and were awaiting GVN approval at the end of the reporting period.

e. G-4 Activities:

(1) On 6 October 1968, the 3d Bde, 82d Airborne Division became OPCON to CMAC replacing the 3d Bde, 25th Division. Efforts were made to acquire adequate facilities on Tan Son Nhut (TSN) Airbase for the Command Post and brigade support activities. Requests were submitted to USAHAC for the 79th Ordnance Detachment Compound on TSN, which was in the process of being evacuated. USAHAC evaluated this request along with other requests for the 79th Ord Det area, and a decision was made to allocate Camp Red Ball, a compound larger than the requested facility, to the 3d Bde, 82d Abn Div. Camp Red Ball is now occupied by the Brigade Command Post.

(2) Action was taken to acquire 5th Special Forces Camp Goodman, adjacent to HQ, CMAC in order to improve working conditions for CMAC personnel. This facility would provide billeting for key personnel and noon messing facilities. Assignment of this facility to CMAC would also provide a needed motor pool and maintenance area, with orderly room and storage space for CMAC and HQ Co Supply. MACV at the end of the reporting period was studying the proposal to relocate the Command Liaison Detachment, 5th Special Forces Group from Camp Goodman and make it available to the Capital Military Assistance Command.

(3) The arrangement of having the G-1, G-4, AG, IO, Hq Comdt, HQ Co and parts of the G-2 and G-5 in the MACV Annex separated from other elements of the headquarters which are in the CMD Compound was unsatisfactory. Arrangements were made to obtain Building #3, Quartermaster Advisory Team Building at the CMD Compound, so that the entire CMAC headquarters could be located in Camp Le Van Duyet. Plans to renovate newly acquired buildings, when they are made available, have been made and a project submitted to the USAHAC Engineer. Estimated completion date and date staff sections can move out of the MACV Annex were not available at the end of the quarter.

(4) On 6 September 1968, the Commanding General, 1st Log Cmd established a revised system for reporting information on logistical problems of concern to major commanders. This new system provides for a semi-monthly report from CMAC on logistical problems considered to be critical and vital to mission accomplishment. The Commander's Critical Items List (CCIL) is

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given immediate attention and special management. Results received through reports by CMAC indicate it is a valuable aid.

(5) To maintain the vital radar screen around the city of Saigon, and keep radar sets and ancillary equipment operational to the maximum degree possible, the following actions were taken:

(a) It was requested that the 519th Signal Detachment (Radar Repair) located in Long Binh, be moved to Saigon where it would be more readily available to perform maintenance on radar sets OPCON to CMAC. The request was approved and the 519th Signal Detachment is now located at Camp Red Ball, near Tan Son Nhut AFB.

(b) Back up equipment was obtained by CMAC to be used as float items when the OPCON radar sets or power supplies could not be quickly placed in operation by a contact team. Additional float TPS-33 and 25 Radar Sets were requested from USARV.

(c) A qualified generator repairman with a basic load of generator repair parts is available to work on generators at any of the radar sites OPCON to CMAC. A consolidated PLL has been developed and requisitions submitted for PLL items to support generators that power the various types of radar sets used in the CMD area.

(6) On 28 August 1968, COMUSMACV and GVN approved the CMAC plan to use CS munitions, without prior clearance, in order to quickly suppress enemy rocket and mortar fire in sensitive areas within Gia Dinh Province. All available rounds of 105mm and 4.2" CS were obtained and issued to the OPCON units. The rounds are experimental items and are not available in the normal supply system. These rounds are retained in the CMD area of operation; when units are released from OPCON to this headquarters, the 105mm and 4.2" CS munitions are transferred to relieving units.

f. G-5 Activities:

(1) During the quarter, procedures were established for regular pre-planned and PSYOP missions within CMAC/CMD AO. Missions were flown by the 5th Special Operations Squadron (USAF) with an EM aboard from the 6th PSYOP Bn Direct Support Team. Targeting included cumulative as well as current intelligence as a basis for selection.

(a) Average number of PSYOP flights: 4 per day (11 hrs); 28 targets.

(b) Typical Schedule: 0500-1200 by U10 (average 13 targets), 2200-0500 by C-47 (average 15 targets).

(2) On 28 August, G-5 began maintaining a continuous 30 minute on-call capability to provide aerial PSYOP support in the form of a special explanatory tape in conjunction with use of CS artillery fire to suppress rocket/Mortar attacks.

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g. Artillery:

(1) The AN/MPQ-4A radars employed by CMAC proved relatively ineffective in locating enemy low trajectory weapons, specifically rockets. A modification was performed on all radars in CMAC in October which provided for the detection and location of low trajectory weapons using a single beam intercept and extrapolation technique. This modification should greatly enhance the CMAC rocket detection capability of the radars to function in a counter-artillery role.

(2) Evaluation of the flash base and plotting central has resulted in the conclusion that the existing system does not provide adequate coverage to assure accurate target location or the desired degree of flexibility to respond rapidly to multiple rocket attack. Accordingly, a new flash base plan has been designed employing 16 US observation posts instead of the present nine, two separate radio reporting nets, and two M-5 plotting boards. To expand the base at minimum costs in personnel and equipment, the plan calls for establishment of one new double OP and the addition of sufficient personnel to five of the existing OPs to double the sector of search. This expansion provides in effect four OPs observing at the same time in each of the four quadrants. To provide the flexibility necessary during multiple attacks, a second M-5 plotting table will be used in the plotting central and an additional radio net will be employed resulting in eight OPs each reporting on separate nets to two plotting agencies. The resulting coverage from this expanded system should be adequate to insure the required azimuth rays to develop an accurate intersection on enemy first rocket launchings.

h. Engineers:

(1) The replacement of the 3d Bde, 25th Div by the 3d Bde, 82d Abn Div on 6 October, increased the number of engineer units within the command from one to two companies, since the latter unit has an organic Engineer Company whereas the former does not.

(2) The improvement of security on the 28 critical bridges within the CMAC AO continued to be the primary mission of the Engineer Section. Temporary lighting was installed on six bridges and improved on 13 bridges. Most of the lighting was concentrated on bridge structures and approaches to deter waterborne saboteurs. Pier protection was provided for 11 bridges, four of which received only temporary concertina pier protection. Permanent protection will be installed later by the RVNAF Engineers. Defensive positions were constructed and improved at 27 bridges; this included 26 prefabricated multiple occupancy bunkers and one bunker tower.

(3) A mobile repair team was formed to perform maintenance on the lighting systems on the critical bridges. This team repaired generators and wiring, replaced light bulbs, installed new lights as required and provided emergency back up generators.

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(4) A CMAC Bridge Project Officer program was initiated for 20 of the critical bridges. The Project Officers served as expeditors for making improvements in bridge defenses. They made day and night inspections at least weekly and kept current on the status of defenses. In conjunction with this program a nightly bridge inspection program was initiated in which representatives from US units or US Advisors inspect the same 20 bridges nightly and report all deficiencies in bridge security to this headquarters. A similar, though at present less extensive program, has been initiated by HQ, CMD.

(5) A project to provide permanent commercial lighting on 25 bridges was approved by HQ, USARV. The lighting will be contractor installed and will illuminate piers and water approaches in addition to the roadways.

(6) Other projects throughout the quarter included construction of radar towers, fire support bases, and revetments.

1. Signal:

(1) Communications facilities continued to expand to keep pace with the growth of CMAC. The addition of security equipment on selected FM radio nets allowed fast, reliable and secure communications. An example of a newly secured net links the ground surveillance and counter mortar radar observers with the CMAC Fire Support Element. The initiation of this secure net greatly reduced the time required to transmit enemy sightings and bring fires to bear. This added security, plus added emphasis on correct reporting procedures has done much to add to the effectiveness of the counter rocket/mortar program.

(2) The arrival of six radio teletypewriter sets, AN/GRC-142, added to the overall effectiveness of communications between this headquarters and its OPCON brigades. A rapid hard copy secure means was installed to provide continuous RATT communications regardless of the location or frequency of displacement of a brigade headquarters.

(3) During the reporting period, work was commenced on a new fixed plant communications center which was scheduled for completion next quarter and will provide high speed, high quality traffic capabilities to higher headquarters and entry into the world-wide network through the Phu Lam DCS facility. In addition, slow speed service will still be available to subordinate units that are unable to terminate high speed circuits. USAHAC Engineer, with support of the 18th Engineer Brigade, is nearing completion of the facility. The 1st Signal Brigade will install the new communications equipment as soon as it arrives from CONUS.

(4) Communications responsibilities expanded to include support to advisory elements throughout the area of operation. Additional radio

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nets were established to reduce the amount of traffic passed on the Gia Dinh Sector net. This was accomplished by the establishment of separate nets for each of the six sub-sectors in Gia Dinh and the establishment of an Artillery Fire Clearance Net. Telephone service was expanded to provide an additional means of communications between sector and sub-sector.

j. Information Office:

(1) The Public Information Section continued coverage of CMAC/CMD activities to the fullest extent possible. The home town news program was continued on a limited basis commensurate with personnel resources. Liaison was maintained with CMAC Staff Sections, OPCON unit information offices, US and ARVN News Media, and the Joint US Public Affairs Office.

(2) The Command Information Section continued daily publication of the CMAC World Report and published the 1st edition of a semi-monthly newspaper. Initial application for authorization to publish a full color magazine on CMAC history and activities was submitted. Command Information Fact Sheets have been published on a regular basis. Distribution of all command information material now includes Team 100 and CMAC operational control units.

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2. (C) Section 2, Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations.

a. Personnel, None

b. Operations,

(1) Employment of E-8 Chemical Launcher.

(a) OBSERVATION: The E-8 launcher can be employed accurately and rapidly with a high degree of mobility.

(b) EVALUATION: The E-8 launcher can be quickly secured to the tank xenon search light by means of the straps provided. This arrangement permits elevation to be applied by gun control means.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That E-8 launchers in tank units be mounted on xenon search lights.

(2) Use of Mine Detectors.

(a) OBSERVATION: Mine detectors can greatly enhance the probability of discovering enemy caches.

(b) EVALUATION: Significant weapons, ammunition and equipment caches have been discovered through the employment of mine detectors. Several of the caches were located under water and probably would not have otherwise been discovered.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That use of mine detectors be continued with emphasis on new techniques in their employment.

(3) Mortar Firing Positions.

(a) OBSERVATION: Units operating in wet areas often have difficulty finding suitable hardstand for mortars.

(b) EVALUATION: When establishing night defensive positions in both jungle and delta areas, trees with extensive root systems will provide limited hardstand potential. By cutting these trees at ground level and using the existing root system as a foundation, the 81mm mortar base plate will be less likely to sink into the ground during firing. Another technique used is placement of the base plate on a salvage 2½ ton truck tire.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: These techniques be considered for inclusion in appropriate current FM's.

(4) Use of Starlight Scope with M-60 LMG.

(a) OBSERVATION: The starlight scope with the M-60 LMG can be an effective combination.

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(b) EVALUATION: The starlight scope with observer should be positioned near the machine gun and gunner. The observer and gunner together adjust short bursts onto the target and continue the delivery of observed fire. Although the starlight image is somewhat blurred by the light emitted by tracer rounds, fire can nevertheless be adjusted effectively if the ratio of tracer to ball ammunition is not too high.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the normal ratio of tracer to ball ammunition be decreased prior to using the M-60 LMG in conjunction with the starlight scope.

(5) Radar Sightings.

(a) OBSERVATION: Radar sightings in relatively populated areas often cannot be cleared for firing.

(b) EVALUATION: Sightings which cannot be cleared are tracked until such time as they can be cleared or until a definite route of movement can be determined. A grid can be pre-cleared ahead of the target and artillery laid to fire a TOT Mission when the enemy enters the cleared target zone.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That procedures be established to accurately identify and plot individual moving targets.

(6) Combined Operations.

(a) OBSERVATION: Detailed planning and coordination are especially important in US-ARVN operations.

(b) EVALUATION: Differences in language, background and experience increase the possibility of misunderstanding. The assumption that both parties understand the intricacies of pending operations can be a dangerous one, regardless of the amount of time spent in joint planning. Coordination between commanders is continuous throughout the conduct of a combined operation to detect and minimize misunderstanding.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That interpreters take part in planning conferences, that written instructions be given whenever possible, liaison officers exchanged between participating headquarters, and finally that effective communications are prearranged and checked.

(7) Orientation of Observation Posts.

(a) OBSERVATION: Experience indicated that once a rocket flash was detected by a tower observer, rapid orientation of other observers could not be accomplished effectively utilizing the M-5 plotting board.

(b) EVALUATION: To quickly disseminate primary azimuths of observation a system of prenumbered grids was initiated. One hundred and eight blocks containing four grid squares each were selected and numbered. Azimuths from each of the nine observation towers to each prenumbered

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grid block were derived using the M-5 plotting board. The compiled list of azimuths were placed at all towers. Employing this system, CMAC plotting central can orient observation towers simultaneously in three seconds whereas previously it required at least 3 minutes.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: N/A

(8) Command Posts.

(a) OBSERVATION: An aerial command post has limitations during prolonged contact.

(b) EVALUATION: When two or more battalions are conducting coordinated operations against significant enemy strength, the establishment of a forward brigade CP on the ground is usually preferable to giving multibattalion control to one battalion, or to using only an aerial CP.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That careful consideration be given to establishment of the tactical CP prior to each operation.

(9) Use of Claymore Mines.

(a) OBSERVATION: Claymore mines can be used in an offensive as well as defensive role.

(b) EVALUATION: Communications wire, electrical blasting caps and radio batteries can be employed to set claymore mines out to ranges of hundreds of meters. The mines are "daisy chained" through use of detonating cord to cover the target area.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That ambush patrols use this extended reach when a concealed position cannot be found near the desired killing zone; that units consider claymore mines to provide more depth to their positions.

(10) Crossing of Waterways.

(a) OBSERVATION: Traversing of waterways on foot at low tide is extremely difficult.

(b) EVALUATION: Normally 12-36 inches of silt and mud are left at the banks of canals and some streams when the water recedes. Units faced with this situation cut nipa palms to place on the mud to provide a walkway. When required to walk through mud, troops walk on the balls of their feet, lean forward, and avoid halting. The crossing site must be well secured.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: N/A

c. Training.

Rocket/Mortar Defense Reaction Tests.

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(a) OBSERVATION: Rapid and accurate detection of a hostile rocket/mortar launch and quick engagement of the firing site contribute significantly to a successful rocket/mortar defense.

(b) EVALUATION: CMAC has developed and implemented a simple test to evaluate detection means and reaction time. The test is initiated by firing one round (HE VT) at a predesignated precleared grid. The OP's report their sightings to the CMAC FSE. Plotting Central at CMAC FSE plots the reported sightings using M-5 plotting boards. As soon as a grid is developed it is forwarded to an artillery Fire Control Headquarters which directs a fire unit to attack the target. The target is engaged with 2 rounds of shell HC smoke. (NOTE: In response to an enemy rocket attack CS munitions are used to suppress the enemy until HE clearance is obtained). The following are used to judge reaction time: FSE Time - time from reported flash to development of grid and passing of information to Arty Central Headquarters; Bn FDC Time - time from receipt of information at Arty Central Headquarters to receipt at fire unit; fire unit time - time from receipt at fire unit to firing the first round. Since implementation of this test, reaction time has been reduced and a sense of competition developed between the artillery units in CMAC.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Units with a similar mission implement like tests to evaluate the proficiency of observation means and firing elements.

d. Intelligence.

(1) Locating Enemy Caches.

(a) OBSERVATION: The enemy often locates his caches below normal water levels.

(b) EVALUATION: Due to the natural erosion of soil, pockets are formed along rivers and canals, particularly under the hardstand upon which houses are built. These pockets are ideal for hiding items of value to the enemy.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That searches near rivers and canals be made at low tide and include a careful inspection of the water's edge and the use of probing rods and mine detectors.

(2) Recording Cache Data.

(a) OBSERVATION: The enemy utilizes many ingenious techniques to conceal his supplies from friendly searches.

(b) EVALUATION: Records of cache finds are maintained at battalion level and above, and are continually analyzed to detect patterns in concealment, construction, marking, placement, protection, and retrieval. As a minimum, this analysis causes an AO to be more thoroughly and systematically searched.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That combat units maintain comprehensive data per-

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taining to all cache sites.

(3) Evaluation of Agent Reports.

(a) OBSERVATION: A well planned agent evaluation system will assist greatly in determining reliability of reports.

(b) EVALUATION: A recently begun evaluation process entails the prompt submission by subordinate units of information which confirms or denies information produced by each agent, and any additional information determining the agent's reliability and usefulness. Reports have already confirmed the reliability of certain agents. Some difficulty has been experienced in obtaining data due to agents operating in more than one unit AO.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: N/A

e. Logistics: None

f. Organization: None

g. Other.

(1) Recognition of Vietnamese Effort.

(a) OBSERVATION: Cooperation and coordination between ARVN, RF-PF, National Police and US forces can be improved by recognizing the Vietnamese contribution to the discovery of enemy materiel.

(b) EVALUATION: It has been found that when conducting operations in support of VN forces, and/or when operations are based upon VN intelligence sources, increased rapport was established by giving official credit and recognition for all enemy materiel found or captured. In many cases this involved the transfer of captured items to the VN. The US intelligence officer must insure that items of intelligence value are rapidly evaluated prior to directing them towards VN channels.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: This evaluation be considered in revision of the appropriate FM.

(2) Prevention of Immersion Foot.

(a) OBSERVATION: Non-stop operations in inundated areas will result in reduced combat efficiency due to immersion foot.

(b) EVALUATION: The problem of immersion foot has been greatly reduced in some units by the practice of companies operating exclusively at night and maintaining equipment and resting during the day. Tactical situation permitting, shower shoes are worn for short periods.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That units operating in severe wet conditions be permitted whenever possible to stand down a minimum of 3-4 hours during daylight hours.

(3) PSYOPS Novelties. **CONFIDENTIAL**

(a) OBSERVATION: Face to face PSYOP activity is more credible if pro-GVN materials are given to Vietnamese by their own countrymen.

(b) EVALUATION: To insure the target is actually reached, a US PSYOPERATOR must at all times accompany the Vietnamese team. He must remain unobtrusive, however, and the true purpose of his visit unknown to his counterparts. He can assume the role of gathering information for similar future programs, and of recording reaction by careful monitoring of the recipients.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: PSYOPS personnel insure that all material reaches the intended target.

(4) Searching of VN Civilians.

(a) OBSERVATION: Searching of Vietnamese suspects and detainees must be accomplished by Vietnamese unless operational necessity dictates otherwise.

(b) EVALUATION: On a joint US-Vietnamese cordon and search in which there was no contact, several US enlisted men searched VN suspects. During the process, some piasters fell on the floor. A US soldier put the money in his pocket and then turned the suspect over to the interpreter. At the same time he gave the money to the interpreter who returned it to the suspect. Some VN soldiers saw the EM put the piasters in his pocket but did not see them returned. As a result, the operation was held up for two hours until the Vietnamese commanders were satisfied that the money had not been stolen.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: To avoid the possibility of misunderstanding unit leaders closely supervise their men to insure that current policy relevant to searching VN nationals and their property is followed.

(5) Removal of Barbed Wire.

(a) OBSERVATION: The extensive use of barrier material in RVN sometimes restricts civilian movement.

(b) EVALUATION: Development of the civilian economy makes it desirable to remove barbed wire and other barrier materials from areas where no longer needed, consistent with tactical necessity. This process should be continuous in order to permit maximum use of roads and fields by the friendly population.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Established tactical barriers be reviewed periodically to determine their tactical usefulness.

(6) Development of PSYOP Material by Non-PSYOP-Trained Personnel.

(a) OBSERVATION: US personnel in other than PSYOP units prepare material for use in their operations.

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(b) EVALUATION: Due to ethnic and cultural differences, communication with Vietnamese Nationals is frequently difficult. Further, there is the risk of producing material which is actually counterproductive and/or in violation of current JUSPAO guidance.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That all material be forwarded through PSYOP channels for screening prior to usage.

(7) Enemy Bunker Destruction.

(a) OBSERVATION: An engineer company in support of an infantry brigade during operations in an enemy staging area developed techniques for enemy bunker destruction.

(b) EVALUATION: During the period 4 to 20 October 1968, A Co, 31st Engineer Bn furnished technical and materiel support to the 199th LIB in an area 15 KM west of Saigon. Approximately 900 structures varying from eight man bunkers to one man positions and punji pits were destroyed. The best system was to break the engineers into three-man demolition teams to work with each infantry platoon. When a bunker complex was located, the infantry unit would secure the area while the demolition team(s) reduced the structures. The explosives used throughout was C-4. Non-electrical priming was used as this required less logistical effort and was more rapid to employ. Duds artillery rounds in the area required a minimum of four pounds of C-4 to assure destruction.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That engineer technical and materiel support of demolition operations be tailored to the given situation for maximum efficiency; that under less than ideal conditions, planning for destruction of duds consider the expenditure of more than normal amounts of explosives.

(8) Emergency Repair of Bridge Security Lighting.

(a) OBSERVATION: Lighting systems of critical bridges can develop deficiencies or lose power without warning.

(b) EVALUATION: To assist in eliminating the vulnerability of bridges, a mobile lighting repair team has been developed. This team, formed from and equipped by a US Army Engineer unit, has a vehicle, tools, materials, standby generators and communications equipment. When a lighting deficiency develops, the unit securing the bridge contacts the CMAC TOC, who in turn contacts the repair team. The team moves to the bridge and attempts to repair the deficiency. If necessary, and if possible, they utilize their standby generator until the power system can be repaired. Most prevalent problems encountered thus far are with generators and burned out bulbs.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Units with similar missions consider the formation of mobile lighting repair teams.

(9) Teletype Networks.

(a) OBSERVATION: The current teletype networks are not responsive to

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the needs of an operational headquarters

(b) EVALUATION: Common user teletype service is a necessity for any operational headquarters. This need was not recognized at first because CMAC was established as a tactical headquarters with few administrative or logistical responsibilities. As a result, only sole-user operational circuits were established to other headquarters. CMAC has teletype service to the MACV COC and II FFV TOC rather than to MACV and II FFV headquarters. However, the action element of higher headquarters is frequently a staff element, rather than the operations center. Coordination of rear area security measures also often requires a message capability to administrative and logistical headquarters (such as USAHAC) in their role as security forces, yet these headquarters are not served by the sole-user operational teletype circuits. Since there is no theater common-user network in Vietnam, satisfaction of these, as well as administrative and logistical requirements, require connections to the DCS major relay at Phu Lam.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That a theater common - user teletype network be designed, installed and implemented for US forces in the Republic of Vietnam, or that the world-wide teletype networks be expanded and world-wide routing indicators assigned to all operational headquarters.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

2 Incls

~~1-AO of CMAC OPCON/CMD Units w/d, Hq, DA~~

2-List of CMAC OPCON Units



R. L. ERRHALT

Major, AGC

Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:

4-CG, II FFORCEV: G-3 Analysis

3-CG, USARV, ATTN: AVHGC (DIST)

2-CINCUSARPAC, ATTN: GPOP-DT

10-G-3 CMAC

50-CG, USACDC, Ft Belvoir, Virginia, ATTN:
Dir of Evaluation (for information)

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AVFBC-RE-H (20 Nov 68) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Capital Military Assistance Command (PROV)
for Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (RI)

DA, HQ II FFORCEV, APO San Francisco 96266 16 DEC 1968

THRU: Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC(DST), APO 96375

Commander-In-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (U) Subject report is forwarded.
2. (U) This headquarters has reviewed and concurs with the Operational Report-Lessons Learned of Capital Military Assistance Command (PROV) for the period ending 31 October 1968, with the exceptions noted below.
3. (C) Reference para 1g (1). The modification performed on all radars modified the computer only, enabling it to compute the location of rockets using a single beam intercept. The radar capability to detect rockets and mortars has not changed. Further, this modification has done nothing to enhance the function in a countermortar role.
4. (U) Reference para 2b(5). Concur. Most units throughout III CTZ are currently using this technique.
5. (U) Reference para 2c. Concur. The Bien Hoa Tactical Area Command has initiated a similar program.
6. (U) Reference para 2g (9). Nonconcur.
 - a. CMAC has teletype service to II FFORCEV Headquarters Main Communications Center rather than the II FFORCEV TOC.
 - b. As stated in paragraph 2g (9)(b), there is no theater common-user teletype network; however, the Army Area Communications System, operated by 1st Signal Brigade, is the common-user network for Vietnam. CMAC has been assigned a World-Wide routing indicator and is scheduled to receive a circuit into the World-Wide/Army Area Communications System.
 - c. In reference to paragraph 2g(9)(c), MACV has directed that effective 15 October 1968, all common-user communications centers will have World-Wide

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
AVFBC-RE-H (20 NOV 68) 1st Ind

16 DEC 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Capital Military Assistance Command (PROV)
for Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (RI)

routing indicators and that requests will be submitted by stations requiring such indicators.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


O. B. FORY
1LT, AGC
Asst AG

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AVHGC-DST (20 Nov 68) 2d Ind

20 DEC 1968


SUBJECT: Operational Report of Capital Military Assistance Command
(Prov) for Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (RL)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,
APO 96558

This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1968 from Headquarters, United States Capital Military Assistance Command (Prov) and concurs with the report as modified by the 1st Indorsement.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


W. C. ARNTZ
CPT, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

GPOP-DT (20 Nov 68) 3d Ind (U)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, Capital Military Assist Comd
(Prov) for Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 14 JAN 1969

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:



C. L. SHORTT
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

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OPCON UNITS

199th Light Infantry Brigade (SEP)

3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division (6 October - 31 October 1968)

3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division (1 August - 6 October 1968)

3d Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry Regiment (-) w/B-1/7th Air Cavalry attached.

5th Battalion, 16th Artillery

USAHAC (For Security Matters Only)

Inclosure 2 To CMAC ORLL, for period ending 31 Oct 68.

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Security Classification

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(Security classification of title, body of abstract and indexing annotation must be entered when the overall report is classified)

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